Competing matchmakers / Tanjim Hossain in Management science, Vol. 57 N° 11 (Novembre 2011)  

Public ISBD [article]  inManagement science > Vol. 57 N° 11 (Novembre 2011) . - pp. 1913-1925 Titre : Competing matchmakers : An experimental analysis Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Tanjim Hossain, Auteur ; Dylan Minor, Auteur ; John Morgan, Auteur Année de publication : 2012 Article en page(s) : pp. 1913-1925 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Platform competition Two-sided markets Monopoly E-commerce Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : Platform competition is ubiquitous, yet platform market structure is little understood. Theory models typically suffer from equilibrium multiplicity—platforms might coexist or the market might tip to either platform. We use laboratory experiments to study the outcomes of platform competition. When platforms are primarily vertically differentiated, we find that even when platform coexistence is theoretically possible, markets inevitably tip to the more efficient platform. When platforms are primarily horizontally differentiated, so there is no single efficient platform, we find strong evidence of equilibrium coexistence. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/57/11/1913.abstract [article] Competing matchmakers : An experimental analysis [texte imprimé] / Tanjim Hossain, Auteur ; Dylan Minor, Auteur ; John Morgan, Auteur . - 2012 . - pp. 1913-1925. Management Langues : Anglais (eng) in Management science > Vol. 57 N° 11 (Novembre 2011) . - pp. 1913-1925 Mots-clés : Platform competition Two-sided markets Monopoly E-commerce Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : Platform competition is ubiquitous, yet platform market structure is little understood. Theory models typically suffer from equilibrium multiplicity—platforms might coexist or the market might tip to either platform. We use laboratory experiments to study the outcomes of platform competition. When platforms are primarily vertically differentiated, we find that even when platform coexistence is theoretically possible, markets inevitably tip to the more efficient platform. When platforms are primarily horizontally differentiated, so there is no single efficient platform, we find strong evidence of equilibrium coexistence. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/57/11/1913.abstract

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