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Cooperation Without Enforcement? / Yannis Bakos in Management science, Vol. 57 N° 11 (Novembre 2011) 

Public ISBD [article]  in Management science > Vol. 57 N° 11 (Novembre 2011) . - pp. 1944-1962 Titre : Cooperation Without Enforcement? : A Comparative Analysis of Litigation and Online Reputation as Quality Assurance Mechanisms Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Yannis Bakos, Auteur ; Chrysanthos Dellarocas, Auteur Année de publication : 2012 Article en page(s) : pp. 1944-1962 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Reputation  Litigation  Reputation  and  litigation  trade-off  Reputation  in  markets  Private  ordering  Reputation  and  adverse  selection  Litigation  and  moral  hazard Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : Commerce depends on buyers and sellers fulfilling their contractual obligations; mechanisms inducing such performance are essential to well-functioning markets. Internet-enabled reputation mechanisms that collect and disseminate consumer feedback have emerged as prominent means for inducing seller performance in online and offline markets. This paper compares the ability of reputation and more traditional litigation-like mechanisms for dispute resolution to induce efficient economic outcomes. We use a game-theoretic formulation and derive results for their relative efficiency and effectiveness individually or as complements. We find that the popular view of reputation as an efficient and relatively costless way to induce seller effort under all circumstances is incorrect; reputation is less efficient than litigation in inducing any given level of effort. Thus, reputation improves efficiency only in settings where the high cost of litigation, insufficient damage levels, or low court accuracy induce suboptimal effort or cause market failure. When adverse selection is important, reputation helps reveal the true types of market participants, which may offset its higher cost of inducing effort. Finally, adding reputation to existing litigation mechanisms increases seller effort and may require adjusting damage awards to avoid inducing excessive effort that reduces economic efficiency. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/57/11/1944.abstract [article] Cooperation Without Enforcement? : A Comparative Analysis of Litigation and Online Reputation as Quality Assurance Mechanisms [texte imprimé] / Yannis Bakos, Auteur ; Chrysanthos Dellarocas, Auteur . - 2012 . - pp. 1944-1962. Management Langues : Anglais (eng) in Management science > Vol. 57 N° 11 (Novembre 2011) . - pp. 1944-1962 Mots-clés : Reputation  Litigation  Reputation  and  litigation  trade-off  Reputation  in  markets  Private  ordering  Reputation  and  adverse  selection  Litigation  and  moral  hazard Index. décimale : 658 Organisation des entreprises. Techniques du commerce Résumé : Commerce depends on buyers and sellers fulfilling their contractual obligations; mechanisms inducing such performance are essential to well-functioning markets. Internet-enabled reputation mechanisms that collect and disseminate consumer feedback have emerged as prominent means for inducing seller performance in online and offline markets. This paper compares the ability of reputation and more traditional litigation-like mechanisms for dispute resolution to induce efficient economic outcomes. We use a game-theoretic formulation and derive results for their relative efficiency and effectiveness individually or as complements. We find that the popular view of reputation as an efficient and relatively costless way to induce seller effort under all circumstances is incorrect; reputation is less efficient than litigation in inducing any given level of effort. Thus, reputation improves efficiency only in settings where the high cost of litigation, insufficient damage levels, or low court accuracy induce suboptimal effort or cause market failure. When adverse selection is important, reputation helps reveal the true types of market participants, which may offset its higher cost of inducing effort. Finally, adding reputation to existing litigation mechanisms increases seller effort and may require adjusting damage awards to avoid inducing excessive effort that reduces economic efficiency. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/57/11/1944.abstract