Documents disponibles écrits par cet auteur

Defence and attack of systems with variable attacker system structure detection probability / G. Levitin in Journal of the operational research society (JORS), Vol. 61 N° 1 (Issue spécial) (Janvier 2010) 

Public ISBD [article]  in Journal of the operational research society (JORS) > Vol. 61 N° 1 (Issue spécial) (Janvier 2010) . - pp. 124–133 Titre : Defence and attack of systems with variable attacker system structure detection probability Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : G. Levitin, Auteur ; K. Hausken, Auteur Année de publication : 2011 Article en page(s) : pp. 124–133 Note générale : Recherche opérationnelle Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Attack  Defence  System  demand  Elements  False  targets  Redundancy Index. décimale : 001.424 Résumé : A system consists of identical elements. The cumulative performance of these elements should meet a demand. The defender applies three types of defensive actions to reduce a damage associated with system performance reduction caused by an external attack: deploying separated redundant genuine system elements, deploying false elements, and protecting genuine elements. If the attacker cannot distinguish between genuine and false elements, he chooses a number of elements to attack and then selects the elements at random, distributing his resources equally across these elements. By obtaining intelligence data, the attacker can get full information about the system structure and identify false and unprotected genuine elements. The defender estimates the probability that the attacker can identify all system elements. This paper analyses the influence of this probability in a non-cooperative two-period minmax game between the defender and the attacker. DEWEY : 001.424 ISSN : 0160-5682 En ligne : http://www.palgrave-journals.com/jors/journal/v61/n1/abs/jors2008158a.html [article] Defence and attack of systems with variable attacker system structure detection probability [texte imprimé] / G. Levitin, Auteur ; K. Hausken, Auteur . - 2011 . - pp. 124–133. Recherche opérationnelle Langues : Anglais (eng) in Journal of the operational research society (JORS) > Vol. 61 N° 1 (Issue spécial) (Janvier 2010) . - pp. 124–133 Mots-clés : Attack  Defence  System  demand  Elements  False  targets  Redundancy Index. décimale : 001.424 Résumé : A system consists of identical elements. The cumulative performance of these elements should meet a demand. The defender applies three types of defensive actions to reduce a damage associated with system performance reduction caused by an external attack: deploying separated redundant genuine system elements, deploying false elements, and protecting genuine elements. If the attacker cannot distinguish between genuine and false elements, he chooses a number of elements to attack and then selects the elements at random, distributing his resources equally across these elements. By obtaining intelligence data, the attacker can get full information about the system structure and identify false and unprotected genuine elements. The defender estimates the probability that the attacker can identify all system elements. This paper analyses the influence of this probability in a non-cooperative two-period minmax game between the defender and the attacker. DEWEY : 001.424 ISSN : 0160-5682 En ligne : http://www.palgrave-journals.com/jors/journal/v61/n1/abs/jors2008158a.html

Individual versus overarching protection against strategic attacks / G. Levitin in Journal of the operational research society (JORS), Vol. 63 N° 7 (Juillet 2012) 

Public ISBD [article]  in Journal of the operational research society (JORS) > Vol. 63 N° 7 (Juillet 2012) . - pp. 969–981 Titre : Individual versus overarching protection against strategic attacks Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : G. Levitin, Auteur ; K. Hausken, Auteur Année de publication : 2012 Article en page(s) : pp. 969–981 Note générale : Opeartiona research Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Vulnerability  Defence  Attack  Redundancy  protection  Contest  success  function Index. décimale : 001.424 Résumé : This article considers a system consisting of elements that can be protected and attacked individually and collectively. To destroy the system, the attacker must always penetrate/destroy the collective (overarching) protection. In the case of the parallel system, it also must destroy all elements, whereas in the case of the series system, it must destroy at least one element. Both the attacker and the defender have limited resources and can distribute these freely between the two types of protection. The attacker chooses the resource distribution and the number of attacked elements to maximize the system destruction probability. The defender chooses the resource distribution and the number of protected elements to minimize the system destruction probability. The bi-contest minmax game is formulated and its analytical solutions are presented and analysed. The asymptotical analysis of the solutions is presented. The influence of the game parameters on the optimal defence and attack strategies is discussed. DEWEY : 001.424 ISSN : 0160-5682 En ligne : http://www.palgrave-journals.com/jors/journal/v63/n7/abs/jors201196a.html [article] Individual versus overarching protection against strategic attacks [texte imprimé] / G. Levitin, Auteur ; K. Hausken, Auteur . - 2012 . - pp. 969–981. Opeartiona research Langues : Anglais (eng) in Journal of the operational research society (JORS) > Vol. 63 N° 7 (Juillet 2012) . - pp. 969–981 Mots-clés : Vulnerability  Defence  Attack  Redundancy  protection  Contest  success  function Index. décimale : 001.424 Résumé : This article considers a system consisting of elements that can be protected and attacked individually and collectively. To destroy the system, the attacker must always penetrate/destroy the collective (overarching) protection. In the case of the parallel system, it also must destroy all elements, whereas in the case of the series system, it must destroy at least one element. Both the attacker and the defender have limited resources and can distribute these freely between the two types of protection. The attacker chooses the resource distribution and the number of attacked elements to maximize the system destruction probability. The defender chooses the resource distribution and the number of protected elements to minimize the system destruction probability. The bi-contest minmax game is formulated and its analytical solutions are presented and analysed. The asymptotical analysis of the solutions is presented. The influence of the game parameters on the optimal defence and attack strategies is discussed. DEWEY : 001.424 ISSN : 0160-5682 En ligne : http://www.palgrave-journals.com/jors/journal/v63/n7/abs/jors201196a.html

Parallel systems under two sequential attacks with imperfect detection of the first attack outcome / G. Levitin in Journal of the operational research society (JORS), Vol. 63 N° 11 (Novembre 2012) 

Public ISBD [article]  in Journal of the operational research society (JORS) > Vol. 63 N° 11 (Novembre 2012) . - pp. 1545–1555 Titre : Parallel systems under two sequential attacks with imperfect detection of the first attack outcome Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : G. Levitin, Auteur ; K. Hausken, Auteur Année de publication : 2012 Article en page(s) : pp. 1545–1555 Note générale : operational research Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : attack;  defence;  parallel  system;  identification  error;  survivability;  minmax Index. décimale : 001.424 Résumé : The paper compares the efficiency of single and double attack against a system consisting of identical parallel elements. An attacker maximizes the system vulnerability (probability of total destruction). In order to destroy the system, the attacker distributes its constrained resource optimally across two attacks and chooses the number of elements to be attacked in the first attack. The attacker observes which elements are destroyed and not destroyed in the first attack and allocates its remaining resource into attacking the remaining elements in the second attack. The paper considers two types of identification errors: wrong identification of a destroyed element as not destroyed, and wrong identification of a not destroyed element as destroyed. First, the influence of the identification error probabilities on the optimal attack strategy against a system with a fixed number of elements is analysed. Thereafter, a minmax two-period game between the attacker and the defender is considered, in which the defender in the first period distributes its constrained resource between deploying redundant elements and protecting them against the attack in the second period. It is shown how the identification error probabilities affect the defence strategy. DEWEY : 001.424 ISSN : 0160-5682 En ligne : http://www.palgrave-journals.com/jors/journal/v63/n11/abs/jors20124a.html [article] Parallel systems under two sequential attacks with imperfect detection of the first attack outcome [texte imprimé] / G. Levitin, Auteur ; K. Hausken, Auteur . - 2012 . - pp. 1545–1555. operational research Langues : Anglais (eng) in Journal of the operational research society (JORS) > Vol. 63 N° 11 (Novembre 2012) . - pp. 1545–1555 Mots-clés : attack;  defence;  parallel  system;  identification  error;  survivability;  minmax Index. décimale : 001.424 Résumé : The paper compares the efficiency of single and double attack against a system consisting of identical parallel elements. An attacker maximizes the system vulnerability (probability of total destruction). In order to destroy the system, the attacker distributes its constrained resource optimally across two attacks and chooses the number of elements to be attacked in the first attack. The attacker observes which elements are destroyed and not destroyed in the first attack and allocates its remaining resource into attacking the remaining elements in the second attack. The paper considers two types of identification errors: wrong identification of a destroyed element as not destroyed, and wrong identification of a not destroyed element as destroyed. First, the influence of the identification error probabilities on the optimal attack strategy against a system with a fixed number of elements is analysed. Thereafter, a minmax two-period game between the attacker and the defender is considered, in which the defender in the first period distributes its constrained resource between deploying redundant elements and protecting them against the attack in the second period. It is shown how the identification error probabilities affect the defence strategy. DEWEY : 001.424 ISSN : 0160-5682 En ligne : http://www.palgrave-journals.com/jors/journal/v63/n11/abs/jors20124a.html

The timing and deterrence of terrorist attacks due to exogenous dynamics / K. Hausken in Journal of the operational research society (JORS), Vol. 63 N° 6 (Juin 2012) 

Public ISBD [article]  in Journal of the operational research society (JORS) > Vol. 63 N° 6 (Juin 2012) . - pp. 726–735 Titre : The timing and deterrence of terrorist attacks due to exogenous dynamics Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : K. Hausken, Auteur ; J. Zhuang, Auteur Année de publication : 2012 Article en page(s) : pp. 726–735 Note générale : Operational research Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Terrorism  Terror  capacity  Threat  Conflict  Dynamics  Contest  success  function Index. décimale : 001.424 Résumé : In this paper, we develop a model for the timing and deterrence of terrorist attacks due to exogenous dynamics. The defender moves first and the attacker second in a two-stage game which is repeated over T periods. We study the effects of dynamics of several critical components of counter-terrorism games, including the unit defence costs (eg, immediately after an attack, the defender would easily acquire defensive funding), unit attack costs (eg, the attacker may accumulate resources as time goes), and the asset valuation (eg, the asset valuation may change over time). We study deterministic dynamics and conduct simulations using random dynamics. We determine the timing of terrorist attacks and how these can be deterred. DEWEY : 001.424 ISSN : 0160-5682 En ligne : http://www.palgrave-journals.com/jors/journal/v63/n6/abs/jors201179a.html [article] The timing and deterrence of terrorist attacks due to exogenous dynamics [texte imprimé] / K. Hausken, Auteur ; J. Zhuang, Auteur . - 2012 . - pp. 726–735. Operational research Langues : Anglais (eng) in Journal of the operational research society (JORS) > Vol. 63 N° 6 (Juin 2012) . - pp. 726–735 Mots-clés : Terrorism  Terror  capacity  Threat  Conflict  Dynamics  Contest  success  function Index. décimale : 001.424 Résumé : In this paper, we develop a model for the timing and deterrence of terrorist attacks due to exogenous dynamics. The defender moves first and the attacker second in a two-stage game which is repeated over T periods. We study the effects of dynamics of several critical components of counter-terrorism games, including the unit defence costs (eg, immediately after an attack, the defender would easily acquire defensive funding), unit attack costs (eg, the attacker may accumulate resources as time goes), and the asset valuation (eg, the asset valuation may change over time). We study deterministic dynamics and conduct simulations using random dynamics. We determine the timing of terrorist attacks and how these can be deterred. DEWEY : 001.424 ISSN : 0160-5682 En ligne : http://www.palgrave-journals.com/jors/journal/v63/n6/abs/jors201179a.html