Documents disponibles écrits par cet auteur

Is leasing greener than selling? / Vishal V. Agrawal in Management science, Vol. 58 N° 3 (Mars 2012) 

Public ISBD [article]  in Management science > Vol. 58 N° 3 (Mars 2012) . - pp. 523-533 Titre : Is leasing greener than selling? Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Vishal V. Agrawal, Auteur ; Mark Ferguson, Auteur ; L. Beril Toktay, Auteur Année de publication : 2012 Article en page(s) : pp. 523-533 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Durable  goods  Sustainable  operations  Green  marketing  Environment  Servicizing Résumé : Based on the proposition that leasing is environmentally superior to selling, some firms have adopted a leasing strategy and others promote their existing leasing programs as environmentally superior to “green” their image. The argument is that because a leasing firm retains ownership of the off-lease units, it has an incentive to remarket them or invest in designing a more durable product, resulting in a lower volume of new production and disposal. However, leasing might be environmentally inferior because of the direct control the firm has over the off-lease products, which may prompt the firm to remove them from the market to avoid cannibalizing the demand for new products. Motivated by these issues, we adopt a life-cycle environmental impact perspective and analytically investigate if leasing can be both more profitable and have a lower total environmental impact. We find that leasing can be environmentally worse despite remarketing all off-lease products and greener than selling despite the mid-life removal of off-lease products. Our analysis also provides insights for environmental groups and entities that use different approaches to improve the environmental performance of business practices. We show that imposing disposal fees or encouraging remanufacturing, under some conditions, can actually lead to higher environmental impact. We also identify when educating consumers to be more environmentally conscious can improve the relative environmental performance of leasing. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/58/3.toc [article] Is leasing greener than selling? [texte imprimé] / Vishal V. Agrawal, Auteur ; Mark Ferguson, Auteur ; L. Beril Toktay, Auteur . - 2012 . - pp. 523-533. Management Langues : Anglais (eng) in Management science > Vol. 58 N° 3 (Mars 2012) . - pp. 523-533 Mots-clés : Durable  goods  Sustainable  operations  Green  marketing  Environment  Servicizing Résumé : Based on the proposition that leasing is environmentally superior to selling, some firms have adopted a leasing strategy and others promote their existing leasing programs as environmentally superior to “green” their image. The argument is that because a leasing firm retains ownership of the off-lease units, it has an incentive to remarket them or invest in designing a more durable product, resulting in a lower volume of new production and disposal. However, leasing might be environmentally inferior because of the direct control the firm has over the off-lease products, which may prompt the firm to remove them from the market to avoid cannibalizing the demand for new products. Motivated by these issues, we adopt a life-cycle environmental impact perspective and analytically investigate if leasing can be both more profitable and have a lower total environmental impact. We find that leasing can be environmentally worse despite remarketing all off-lease products and greener than selling despite the mid-life removal of off-lease products. Our analysis also provides insights for environmental groups and entities that use different approaches to improve the environmental performance of business practices. We show that imposing disposal fees or encouraging remanufacturing, under some conditions, can actually lead to higher environmental impact. We also identify when educating consumers to be more environmentally conscious can improve the relative environmental performance of leasing. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/58/3.toc

Relicensing as a secondary market strategy / Nektarios Oraiopoulos in Management science, Vol. 58 N° 5 (Mai 2012) 

Public ISBD [article]  in Management science > Vol. 58 N° 5 (Mai 2012) . - pp. 1022-1037 Titre : Relicensing as a secondary market strategy Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Nektarios Oraiopoulos, Auteur ; Mark E. Ferguson, Auteur ; L. Beril Toktay, Auteur Année de publication : 2012 Article en page(s) : pp. 1022-1037 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Durable  goods  Secondary  market  Relicensing  fee  Remanufacturing  Closed-loop  supply  chain Résumé : Secondary markets in the information technology industry, where used or refurbished equipment is traded, have been growing steadily. For original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) in this industry, the importance of secondary markets has grown in parallel, not only as a source of revenue, but also because of their impact on these firms' competitive advantage and market strategy. Recent articles in the press have severely criticized some OEMs who are perceived to be actively trying to eliminate the secondary market for their products. Other OEMs have policies that enhance their secondary markets. The goal of this paper is to understand how an OEM's incentives and optimal strategies vis-à-vis the secondary market are shaped contingent on her relative competitive advantage, product characteristics, and consumer preferences. The critical trade-off that we examine is whether the indirect benefit from maintaining an active secondary market (the resale value effect) can outweigh the potentially negative effect of the sales of used products at the expense of new product sales (the cannibalization effect). To that end, we develop a durable good model where the OEM can directly affect the resale value of her product through a relicensing fee charged to the buyer of the refurbished equipment. We analyze the OEM's strategy in both the monopoly and the duopoly cases, characterize the optimal relicensing fee set by the OEM, and draw conclusions on the conditions that favor stimulating or deterring the secondary market. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/58/5/1022.abstract [article] Relicensing as a secondary market strategy [texte imprimé] / Nektarios Oraiopoulos, Auteur ; Mark E. Ferguson, Auteur ; L. Beril Toktay, Auteur . - 2012 . - pp. 1022-1037. Management Langues : Anglais (eng) in Management science > Vol. 58 N° 5 (Mai 2012) . - pp. 1022-1037 Mots-clés : Durable  goods  Secondary  market  Relicensing  fee  Remanufacturing  Closed-loop  supply  chain Résumé : Secondary markets in the information technology industry, where used or refurbished equipment is traded, have been growing steadily. For original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) in this industry, the importance of secondary markets has grown in parallel, not only as a source of revenue, but also because of their impact on these firms' competitive advantage and market strategy. Recent articles in the press have severely criticized some OEMs who are perceived to be actively trying to eliminate the secondary market for their products. Other OEMs have policies that enhance their secondary markets. The goal of this paper is to understand how an OEM's incentives and optimal strategies vis-à-vis the secondary market are shaped contingent on her relative competitive advantage, product characteristics, and consumer preferences. The critical trade-off that we examine is whether the indirect benefit from maintaining an active secondary market (the resale value effect) can outweigh the potentially negative effect of the sales of used products at the expense of new product sales (the cannibalization effect). To that end, we develop a durable good model where the OEM can directly affect the resale value of her product through a relicensing fee charged to the buyer of the refurbished equipment. We analyze the OEM's strategy in both the monopoly and the duopoly cases, characterize the optimal relicensing fee set by the OEM, and draw conclusions on the conditions that favor stimulating or deterring the secondary market. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/58/5/1022.abstract

Stochastic capacity investment and flexible vs. dedicated technology choice in imperfect capital markets / Onur Boyabatlı in Management science, Vol. 57 N° 12 (Décembre 2011) 

Public ISBD [article]  in Management science > Vol. 57 N° 12 (Décembre 2011) . - pp. 2163-2179 Titre : Stochastic capacity investment and flexible vs. dedicated technology choice in imperfect capital markets Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Onur Boyabatlı, Auteur ; L. Beril Toktay, Auteur Année de publication : 2012 Article en page(s) : pp. 2163-2179 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Capacity  Flexibility  Financing  Newsvendor  Limited  liability  Market  imperfection Résumé : This paper analyzes the impact of endogenous credit terms under capital market imperfections in a capacity investment setting. We model a monopolist firm that decides on its technology choice (flexible versus dedicated) and capacity level under demand uncertainty. Differing from the majority of the stochastic capacity investment literature, we assume that the firm is budget constrained and can relax its budget constraint by borrowing from a creditor. The creditor offers technology-specific loan contracts to the firm, after which the firm makes its technology choice and subsequent decisions. Capital market imperfections impose financing frictions on the firm. Our analysis contributes to the capacity investment literature by extending the theory of stochastic capacity investment and flexible versus dedicated technology choice to understand the impact of capital market imperfections, and by analyzing the impact of demand uncertainty (variability and correlation) on the operational decisions and the performance of the firm under different capital market conditions. We demonstrate that the endogenous nature of credit terms in imperfect capital markets may modify or reverse conclusions concerning capacity investment and technology choice obtained under the perfect market assumption and we explain why. The theory developed in this paper suggests some rules of thumb for the strategic management of the capacity and technology choice in imperfect capital markets. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/57/12.toc [article] Stochastic capacity investment and flexible vs. dedicated technology choice in imperfect capital markets [texte imprimé] / Onur Boyabatlı, Auteur ; L. Beril Toktay, Auteur . - 2012 . - pp. 2163-2179. Management Langues : Anglais (eng) in Management science > Vol. 57 N° 12 (Décembre 2011) . - pp. 2163-2179 Mots-clés : Capacity  Flexibility  Financing  Newsvendor  Limited  liability  Market  imperfection Résumé : This paper analyzes the impact of endogenous credit terms under capital market imperfections in a capacity investment setting. We model a monopolist firm that decides on its technology choice (flexible versus dedicated) and capacity level under demand uncertainty. Differing from the majority of the stochastic capacity investment literature, we assume that the firm is budget constrained and can relax its budget constraint by borrowing from a creditor. The creditor offers technology-specific loan contracts to the firm, after which the firm makes its technology choice and subsequent decisions. Capital market imperfections impose financing frictions on the firm. Our analysis contributes to the capacity investment literature by extending the theory of stochastic capacity investment and flexible versus dedicated technology choice to understand the impact of capital market imperfections, and by analyzing the impact of demand uncertainty (variability and correlation) on the operational decisions and the performance of the firm under different capital market conditions. We demonstrate that the endogenous nature of credit terms in imperfect capital markets may modify or reverse conclusions concerning capacity investment and technology choice obtained under the perfect market assumption and we explain why. The theory developed in this paper suggests some rules of thumb for the strategic management of the capacity and technology choice in imperfect capital markets. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/57/12.toc