Les Inscriptions à la Bibliothèque sont ouvertes en
ligne via le site: https://biblio.enp.edu.dz
Les Réinscriptions se font à :
• La Bibliothèque Annexe pour les étudiants en
2ème Année CPST
• La Bibliothèque Centrale pour les étudiants en Spécialités
A partir de cette page vous pouvez :
Retourner au premier écran avec les recherches... |
Détail de l'auteur
Auteur Sanjiv Erat
Documents disponibles écrits par cet auteur
Affiner la rechercheManaging delegated search over design spaces / Sanjiv Erat in Management science, Vol. 58 N° 3 (Mars 2012)
[article]
in Management science > Vol. 58 N° 3 (Mars 2012) . - pp. 606-623
Titre : Managing delegated search over design spaces Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Sanjiv Erat, Auteur ; Vish Krishnan, Auteur Année de publication : 2012 Article en page(s) : pp. 606-623 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Research and development Open innovation Product design Clustering Search Résumé : Organizations increasingly seek solutions to their open-ended design problems by employing a contest approach in which search over a solution space is delegated to outside agents. We study this new class of problems, which are costly to specify, pose credibility issues for the focal firm, and require finely tuned awards for meeting the firm's needs. Through an analytical model, we examine the relationship between problem specification, award structure, and breadth of solution space searched by outside agents toward characterizing how a firm should effectively manage such open-ended design contests. Our results independently establish and offer a causal explanation for an interesting phenomenon observed in design contests—clustering of searchers in specific regions of the solution space. The analysis also yields a cautionary finding—although the breadth of search increases with number of searchers, the relationship is strongly sublinear (logarithmic). Finally, from the practical perspective of managing the delegated search process, our results offer rules of thumb on how many and what size awards should be offered, as well as the extent to which firms should undertake problem specification, contingent on the nature (open-endedness and uncertainty) of the design problem solution being delegated to outside agents. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/58/3.toc [article] Managing delegated search over design spaces [texte imprimé] / Sanjiv Erat, Auteur ; Vish Krishnan, Auteur . - 2012 . - pp. 606-623.
Management
Langues : Anglais (eng)
in Management science > Vol. 58 N° 3 (Mars 2012) . - pp. 606-623
Mots-clés : Research and development Open innovation Product design Clustering Search Résumé : Organizations increasingly seek solutions to their open-ended design problems by employing a contest approach in which search over a solution space is delegated to outside agents. We study this new class of problems, which are costly to specify, pose credibility issues for the focal firm, and require finely tuned awards for meeting the firm's needs. Through an analytical model, we examine the relationship between problem specification, award structure, and breadth of solution space searched by outside agents toward characterizing how a firm should effectively manage such open-ended design contests. Our results independently establish and offer a causal explanation for an interesting phenomenon observed in design contests—clustering of searchers in specific regions of the solution space. The analysis also yields a cautionary finding—although the breadth of search increases with number of searchers, the relationship is strongly sublinear (logarithmic). Finally, from the practical perspective of managing the delegated search process, our results offer rules of thumb on how many and what size awards should be offered, as well as the extent to which firms should undertake problem specification, contingent on the nature (open-endedness and uncertainty) of the design problem solution being delegated to outside agents. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/58/3.toc
[article]
in Management science > Vol. 58 N° 4 (Avril 2012) . - pp. 723-733
Titre : White lies Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Sanjiv Erat, Auteur ; Uri Gneezy, Auteur Année de publication : 2012 Article en page(s) : pp. 723-733 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Deception Lies Cheap talk Experiments Résumé : In this paper we distinguish between two types of white lies: those that help others at the expense of the person telling the lie, which we term altruistic white lies, and those that help both others and the liar, which we term Pareto white lies. We find that a large fraction of participants are reluctant to tell even a Pareto white lie, demonstrating a pure lie aversion independent of any social preferences for outcomes. In contrast, a nonnegligible fraction of participants are willing to tell an altruistic white lie that hurts them a bit but significantly helps others. Comparing white lies to those where lying increases the liar's payoff at the expense of another reveals important insights into the interaction of incentives, lying aversion, and preferences for payoff distributions. Finally, in line with previous findings, women are less likely to lie when it is costly to the other side. Interestingly though, we find that women are more likely to tell an altruistic lie. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/58/4/723.abstract [article] White lies [texte imprimé] / Sanjiv Erat, Auteur ; Uri Gneezy, Auteur . - 2012 . - pp. 723-733.
Management
Langues : Anglais (eng)
in Management science > Vol. 58 N° 4 (Avril 2012) . - pp. 723-733
Mots-clés : Deception Lies Cheap talk Experiments Résumé : In this paper we distinguish between two types of white lies: those that help others at the expense of the person telling the lie, which we term altruistic white lies, and those that help both others and the liar, which we term Pareto white lies. We find that a large fraction of participants are reluctant to tell even a Pareto white lie, demonstrating a pure lie aversion independent of any social preferences for outcomes. In contrast, a nonnegligible fraction of participants are willing to tell an altruistic white lie that hurts them a bit but significantly helps others. Comparing white lies to those where lying increases the liar's payoff at the expense of another reveals important insights into the interaction of incentives, lying aversion, and preferences for payoff distributions. Finally, in line with previous findings, women are less likely to lie when it is costly to the other side. Interestingly though, we find that women are more likely to tell an altruistic lie. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/58/4/723.abstract