How do acquirers retain successful target CEOs? / Julie Wulf in Management science, Vol. 57 N° 12 (Décembre 2011)  

Public ISBD [article]  inManagement science > Vol. 57 N° 12 (Décembre 2011) . - pp. 2101-2114 Titre : How do acquirers retain successful target CEOs? : The role of governance Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Julie Wulf, Auteur ; Harbir Singh, Auteur Année de publication : 2012 Article en page(s) : pp. 2101-2114 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Organizational studies Strategy Motivation–incentives Finance Corporate finance Résumé : The resource-based view argues that acquisitions can build competitive advantage partially through retention of valuable human capital of the target firm. However, making commitments to retain and motivate successful top managers is a challenge when contracts are not enforceable. Investigating the conditions under which target chief executive officers (CEOs) are retained in a sample of mergers in the 1990s, we find greater retention of better-performing and higher-paid CEOs—both measures of valuable human capital. We also show that the performance-retention link is stronger when the acquirer's governance provisions support managers and when the acquirer's CEO owns more equity. Although it is not common for acquirers to retain target CEOs, we argue that they are more likely to do so when their governance environment maintains managerial discretion. Based on a joint analysis of retention and governance, our findings are largely consistent with a managerial human capital explanation of retention. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/57/12.toc [article] How do acquirers retain successful target CEOs? : The role of governance [texte imprimé] / Julie Wulf, Auteur ; Harbir Singh, Auteur . - 2012 . - pp. 2101-2114. Management Langues : Anglais (eng) in Management science > Vol. 57 N° 12 (Décembre 2011) . - pp. 2101-2114 Mots-clés : Organizational studies Strategy Motivation–incentives Finance Corporate finance Résumé : The resource-based view argues that acquisitions can build competitive advantage partially through retention of valuable human capital of the target firm. However, making commitments to retain and motivate successful top managers is a challenge when contracts are not enforceable. Investigating the conditions under which target chief executive officers (CEOs) are retained in a sample of mergers in the 1990s, we find greater retention of better-performing and higher-paid CEOs—both measures of valuable human capital. We also show that the performance-retention link is stronger when the acquirer's governance provisions support managers and when the acquirer's CEO owns more equity. Although it is not common for acquirers to retain target CEOs, we argue that they are more likely to do so when their governance environment maintains managerial discretion. Based on a joint analysis of retention and governance, our findings are largely consistent with a managerial human capital explanation of retention. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/57/12.toc

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