The optimal quantity discount that a supplier should offer / G. Y. Ke in Journal of the operational research society (JORS), Vol. 63 N° 3 (Mars 2012)  

Public ISBD [article]  inJournal of the operational research society (JORS) > Vol. 63 N° 3 (Mars 2012) . - pp. 354–367 Titre : The optimal quantity discount that a supplier should offer Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : G. Y. Ke, Auteur ; J. H. Bookbinder, Auteur Année de publication : 2012 Article en page(s) : pp. 354–367 Note générale : Recherche opérationnelle Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Coordination Quantity discount Price elasticity of demand Game theory Multiobjective decision making Index. décimale : 001.424 Résumé : Quantity discounts are a useful mechanism for coordination. Here we investigate such discounts from the supplier's perspective, both from a non-cooperative game-theoretical approach and a joint decision model. Taking into account the price elasticity of demand, this analysis aids a sole supplier in establishing an all-unit quantity discount policy in light of the buyer's best reaction. The Stackelberg equilibrium and Pareto optimal solution set are derived for the non-cooperative and joint-decision cases, respectively. Our research indicates that channel efficiency can be improved significantly if the quantity discount decision is made jointly rather than non-cooperatively. Moreover, we extend our model in three directions: (1) the product is transported by a private fleet; (2) the buyer may choose to offer her customers a different percentage discount than that she obtained from the supplier; and (3) the case of heterogeneous buyers. Numerical case studies are employed throughout the paper to illustrate the practical applications of the models presented and the sensitivity to model parameters. DEWEY : 001.424 ISSN : 0160-5682 En ligne : http://www.palgrave-journals.com/jors/journal/v63/n3/abs/jors201135a.html [article] The optimal quantity discount that a supplier should offer [texte imprimé] / G. Y. Ke, Auteur ; J. H. Bookbinder, Auteur . - 2012 . - pp. 354–367. Recherche opérationnelle Langues : Anglais (eng) in Journal of the operational research society (JORS) > Vol. 63 N° 3 (Mars 2012) . - pp. 354–367 Mots-clés : Coordination Quantity discount Price elasticity of demand Game theory Multiobjective decision making Index. décimale : 001.424 Résumé : Quantity discounts are a useful mechanism for coordination. Here we investigate such discounts from the supplier's perspective, both from a non-cooperative game-theoretical approach and a joint decision model. Taking into account the price elasticity of demand, this analysis aids a sole supplier in establishing an all-unit quantity discount policy in light of the buyer's best reaction. The Stackelberg equilibrium and Pareto optimal solution set are derived for the non-cooperative and joint-decision cases, respectively. Our research indicates that channel efficiency can be improved significantly if the quantity discount decision is made jointly rather than non-cooperatively. Moreover, we extend our model in three directions: (1) the product is transported by a private fleet; (2) the buyer may choose to offer her customers a different percentage discount than that she obtained from the supplier; and (3) the case of heterogeneous buyers. Numerical case studies are employed throughout the paper to illustrate the practical applications of the models presented and the sensitivity to model parameters. DEWEY : 001.424 ISSN : 0160-5682 En ligne : http://www.palgrave-journals.com/jors/journal/v63/n3/abs/jors201135a.html

Exemplaires

Code-barres	Cote	Support	Localisation	Section	Disponibilité
aucun exemplaire