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Operations of online advertising services and publisher's option / A. Srinivasan in Journal of the operational research society (JORS), Vol. 63 N° 5 (Mai 2012) 

Public ISBD [article]  in Journal of the operational research society (JORS) > Vol. 63 N° 5 (Mai 2012) . - pp. 674–682 Titre : Operations of online advertising services and publisher's option Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : A. Srinivasan, Auteur ; C. Kwon, Auteur Année de publication : 2012 Article en page(s) : pp. 674–682 Note générale : Recherche opérationnelle Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Online  advertising  Nash  bargaining  game  Option  contract Index. décimale : 001.424 Résumé : We analyse the use of options for online advertisement publishers. By providing a discount or rewards to advertisers, publishers can utilise their uncertain service capacity, page-views, more efficiently. We use Generalised Nash Bargaining to study the feasibility of the option contract and solve for an optimal value for the option price. We compare the revenues and benefits from advertisements under the option contract, with those without the options using numerical studies. We also study the impact of pricing and other components in the game on the optimal option price, the publisher's revenues, and the advertiser's benefits from the advertisements. DEWEY : 001.424 ISSN : 0160-5682 En ligne : http://www.palgrave-journals.com/jors/journal/v63/n5/abs/jors201184a.html [article] Operations of online advertising services and publisher's option [texte imprimé] / A. Srinivasan, Auteur ; C. Kwon, Auteur . - 2012 . - pp. 674–682. Recherche opérationnelle Langues : Anglais (eng) in Journal of the operational research society (JORS) > Vol. 63 N° 5 (Mai 2012) . - pp. 674–682 Mots-clés : Online  advertising  Nash  bargaining  game  Option  contract Index. décimale : 001.424 Résumé : We analyse the use of options for online advertisement publishers. By providing a discount or rewards to advertisers, publishers can utilise their uncertain service capacity, page-views, more efficiently. We use Generalised Nash Bargaining to study the feasibility of the option contract and solve for an optimal value for the option price. We compare the revenues and benefits from advertisements under the option contract, with those without the options using numerical studies. We also study the impact of pricing and other components in the game on the optimal option price, the publisher's revenues, and the advertiser's benefits from the advertisements. DEWEY : 001.424 ISSN : 0160-5682 En ligne : http://www.palgrave-journals.com/jors/journal/v63/n5/abs/jors201184a.html