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Norms and contracting / Judd B. Kessler in Management science, Vol. 58 N° 1 (Janvier 2012) 

Public ISBD [article]  in Management science > Vol. 58 N° 1 (Janvier 2012) . - pp. 62-77 Titre : Norms and contracting Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Judd B. Kessler, Auteur ; Stephen Leider, Auteur Année de publication : 2012 Article en page(s) : pp. 62-77 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Experiment  Norms  Incomplete  contracts Résumé : We argue that contracts establish the norms of a relationship and that individuals incur disutility when deviating from these norms. In a laboratory experiment, we allow agents to make simple contracts before they play one of four games, and the most effective contract always includes an unenforceable “handshake” agreement to take the first-best action. In three games, a contract with only this handshake agreement is (at least weakly) optimal. The handshake is particularly effective in games with strategic complements. Our results highlight an explanation for contractual incompleteness: establishing a norm can effectively substitute for weak enforceable restrictions. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/58/1/62.abstract [article] Norms and contracting [texte imprimé] / Judd B. Kessler, Auteur ; Stephen Leider, Auteur . - 2012 . - pp. 62-77. Management Langues : Anglais (eng) in Management science > Vol. 58 N° 1 (Janvier 2012) . - pp. 62-77 Mots-clés : Experiment  Norms  Incomplete  contracts Résumé : We argue that contracts establish the norms of a relationship and that individuals incur disutility when deviating from these norms. In a laboratory experiment, we allow agents to make simple contracts before they play one of four games, and the most effective contract always includes an unenforceable “handshake” agreement to take the first-best action. In three games, a contract with only this handshake agreement is (at least weakly) optimal. The handshake is particularly effective in games with strategic complements. Our results highlight an explanation for contractual incompleteness: establishing a norm can effectively substitute for weak enforceable restrictions. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/58/1/62.abstract