Documents disponibles écrits par cet auteur

Gender, competition, and managerial decisions / Curtis R. Price in Management science, Vol. 58 N° 1 (Janvier 2012) 

Public ISBD [article]  in Management science > Vol. 58 N° 1 (Janvier 2012) . - pp. 114-122 Titre : Gender, competition, and managerial decisions Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Curtis R. Price, Auteur Année de publication : 2012 Article en page(s) : pp. 114-122 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Decision  analysis  Labor  market  Discrimination  Gender  differences  Experiment Résumé : The purpose of this study is to investigate the use of competitive compensation between a manager and a worker in the laboratory. To this end, we impose a simple agency relationship between two groups of subjects termed managers and workers. The manager chooses a compensation scheme for the worker from either a piece rate or a tournament payment scheme and is paid based on the workers performance in the task. The results indicate that when given information about worker ability, male managers choose the tournament significantly less often for a female worker. On the other hand, when no information about worker ability is given to the manager, there is no difference in compensation choice for the worker, although male and female managers differ significantly in their own preferences for compensation scheme. We conjecture that these results are tied to the fact that there is a measurable stereotype that females are worse at the task relative to males, although further research is needed in this regard. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/58/1/114.abstract [article] Gender, competition, and managerial decisions [texte imprimé] / Curtis R. Price, Auteur . - 2012 . - pp. 114-122. Management Langues : Anglais (eng) in Management science > Vol. 58 N° 1 (Janvier 2012) . - pp. 114-122 Mots-clés : Decision  analysis  Labor  market  Discrimination  Gender  differences  Experiment Résumé : The purpose of this study is to investigate the use of competitive compensation between a manager and a worker in the laboratory. To this end, we impose a simple agency relationship between two groups of subjects termed managers and workers. The manager chooses a compensation scheme for the worker from either a piece rate or a tournament payment scheme and is paid based on the workers performance in the task. The results indicate that when given information about worker ability, male managers choose the tournament significantly less often for a female worker. On the other hand, when no information about worker ability is given to the manager, there is no difference in compensation choice for the worker, although male and female managers differ significantly in their own preferences for compensation scheme. We conjecture that these results are tied to the fact that there is a measurable stereotype that females are worse at the task relative to males, although further research is needed in this regard. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/58/1/114.abstract