Aggregation and manipulation in prediction markets / Lian Jian in Management science, Vol. 58 N° 1 (Janvier 2012)  

Public ISBD [article]  inManagement science > Vol. 58 N° 1 (Janvier 2012) . - pp. 123-140 Titre : Aggregation and manipulation in prediction markets : Effects of trading mechanism and information distribution Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Lian Jian, Auteur ; Rahul Sami, Auteur Année de publication : 2012 Article en page(s) : pp. 123-140 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Prediction markets Experiments Market scoring rule Résumé : We conduct laboratory experiments on variants of market scoring rule prediction markets, under different information distribution patterns, to evaluate the efficiency and speed of information aggregation, as well as test recent theoretical results on manipulative behavior by traders. We find that markets structured to have a fixed sequence of trades exhibit greater accuracy of information aggregation than the typical form that has unstructured trade. In comparing two commonly used mechanisms, we find no significant difference between the performance of the direct probability-report form and the indirect security-trading form of the market scoring rule. In the case of the markets with a structured order, we find evidence supporting the theoretical prediction that information aggregation is slower when information is complementary. In structured markets, the theoretical prediction that there will be more delayed trading in complementary markets is supported, but we find no support for the prediction that there will be more bluffing in complementary markets. However, the theoretical predictions are not borne out in the unstructured markets. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/58/1/123.abstract [article] Aggregation and manipulation in prediction markets : Effects of trading mechanism and information distribution [texte imprimé] / Lian Jian, Auteur ; Rahul Sami, Auteur . - 2012 . - pp. 123-140. Management Langues : Anglais (eng) in Management science > Vol. 58 N° 1 (Janvier 2012) . - pp. 123-140 Mots-clés : Prediction markets Experiments Market scoring rule Résumé : We conduct laboratory experiments on variants of market scoring rule prediction markets, under different information distribution patterns, to evaluate the efficiency and speed of information aggregation, as well as test recent theoretical results on manipulative behavior by traders. We find that markets structured to have a fixed sequence of trades exhibit greater accuracy of information aggregation than the typical form that has unstructured trade. In comparing two commonly used mechanisms, we find no significant difference between the performance of the direct probability-report form and the indirect security-trading form of the market scoring rule. In the case of the markets with a structured order, we find evidence supporting the theoretical prediction that information aggregation is slower when information is complementary. In structured markets, the theoretical prediction that there will be more delayed trading in complementary markets is supported, but we find no support for the prediction that there will be more bluffing in complementary markets. However, the theoretical predictions are not borne out in the unstructured markets. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/58/1/123.abstract

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