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Apologies as signals / Benjamin Ho in Management science, Vol. 58 N° 1 (Janvier 2012) 

Public ISBD [article]  in Management science > Vol. 58 N° 1 (Janvier 2012) . - pp. 141-158 Titre : Apologies as signals : With evidence from a trust game Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Benjamin Ho, Auteur Année de publication : 2012 Article en page(s) : pp. 141-158 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Apologies  Remorse  Signaling  Trust  game  Attribution  theory Résumé : Apologies are part of a social institution designed to restore frayed relationships not only in daily life but also in the domains of corporate governance, medical malpractice litigation, political reputation, organizational culture, etc. The theory shows that in a general class of moral hazard games with imperfect information about agents with two-dimensional type, apologies exhibit regular properties—e.g., apologies are more frequent in long relationships, early in relationships, and between better-matched partners. A variant of the trust game demonstrates that communication matters in a manner consistent with economic theory; specifically, the words “I am sorry” appear to select equilibrium behavior consistent with the theory's main predictions. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/58/1/141.abstract [article] Apologies as signals : With evidence from a trust game [texte imprimé] / Benjamin Ho, Auteur . - 2012 . - pp. 141-158. Management Langues : Anglais (eng) in Management science > Vol. 58 N° 1 (Janvier 2012) . - pp. 141-158 Mots-clés : Apologies  Remorse  Signaling  Trust  game  Attribution  theory Résumé : Apologies are part of a social institution designed to restore frayed relationships not only in daily life but also in the domains of corporate governance, medical malpractice litigation, political reputation, organizational culture, etc. The theory shows that in a general class of moral hazard games with imperfect information about agents with two-dimensional type, apologies exhibit regular properties—e.g., apologies are more frequent in long relationships, early in relationships, and between better-matched partners. A variant of the trust game demonstrates that communication matters in a manner consistent with economic theory; specifically, the words “I am sorry” appear to select equilibrium behavior consistent with the theory's main predictions. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/58/1/141.abstract