A multimethod approach to identifying norms and normative expectations within a corporate hierarchy / Stephen V. Burks in Management science, Vol. 58 N° 1 (Janvier 2012)  

Public ISBD [article]  inManagement science > Vol. 58 N° 1 (Janvier 2012) . - pp. 203-217 Titre : A multimethod approach to identifying norms and normative expectations within a corporate hierarchy : Evidence from the financial services industry Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Stephen V. Burks, Auteur ; Erin L. Krupka, Auteur Année de publication : 2012 Article en page(s) : pp. 203-217 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Ethics Norms Vignette Survey Coordination game Incentive compatible Financial services adviser Whistle-blowing Fiduciary responsibility Organizational fit Résumé : We use an incentive-compatible economic experiment and surveys in the field at a large financial services firm to identify the norms for on-the-job behavior among financial advisers and their leaders, and the normative expectations each group has of the other. We examine whistle-blowing on a peer, an incentive clash between serving the client and earning commissions, and a dilemma about fiduciary responsibility to a client. We find patterns of agreement among advisers, among leaders, and between the two groups, that are consistent with company guidelines identified ex ante. However, we also find measurable differences between what leaders expect and the actual norms of advisers. When there is such a mismatch we are able to distinguish miscommunication from ethical disagreement between leaders and advisers. Finally, we show that when advisers' personal ethical opinions do not match group norms, this mismatch is correlated with job dissatisfaction and lying for money in a second experiment. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/58/1/203.abstract [article] A multimethod approach to identifying norms and normative expectations within a corporate hierarchy : Evidence from the financial services industry [texte imprimé] / Stephen V. Burks, Auteur ; Erin L. Krupka, Auteur . - 2012 . - pp. 203-217. Management Langues : Anglais (eng) in Management science > Vol. 58 N° 1 (Janvier 2012) . - pp. 203-217 Mots-clés : Ethics Norms Vignette Survey Coordination game Incentive compatible Financial services adviser Whistle-blowing Fiduciary responsibility Organizational fit Résumé : We use an incentive-compatible economic experiment and surveys in the field at a large financial services firm to identify the norms for on-the-job behavior among financial advisers and their leaders, and the normative expectations each group has of the other. We examine whistle-blowing on a peer, an incentive clash between serving the client and earning commissions, and a dilemma about fiduciary responsibility to a client. We find patterns of agreement among advisers, among leaders, and between the two groups, that are consistent with company guidelines identified ex ante. However, we also find measurable differences between what leaders expect and the actual norms of advisers. When there is such a mismatch we are able to distinguish miscommunication from ethical disagreement between leaders and advisers. Finally, we show that when advisers' personal ethical opinions do not match group norms, this mismatch is correlated with job dissatisfaction and lying for money in a second experiment. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/58/1/203.abstract

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