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Does the rolodex matter? / Bang Dang Nguyen in Management science, Vol. 58 N° 2 (Février 2012) 

Public ISBD [article]  in Management science > Vol. 58 N° 2 (Février 2012) . - pp. 236-252 Titre : Does the rolodex matter? : Corporate elite's small world and the effectiveness of boards of directors Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Bang Dang Nguyen, Auteur Année de publication : 2012 Article en page(s) : pp. 236-252 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Social  networks  CEO  turnover  Board  of  directors  Firm  performance  Corporate  governance Résumé : This paper investigates the impact of social ties on the effectiveness of boards of directors. When the chief executive officer (CEO) and a number of directors belong to the same social networks, the CEO is less likely to be dismissed for poor performance. The results are robust to different measures of performance and networks, and consistent after controlling for CEO ability and connected boards' superior information. Although being ousted is costly for all CEOs—who must then devote time to finding new employment and only succeed in 62% of cases—socially connected CEOs are more likely to find new and better employment after a forced departure. Evidence from this paper suggests that close social ties between board members and CEOs impact the workings of the board of directors. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/58/2/236.abstract [article] Does the rolodex matter? : Corporate elite's small world and the effectiveness of boards of directors [texte imprimé] / Bang Dang Nguyen, Auteur . - 2012 . - pp. 236-252. Management Langues : Anglais (eng) in Management science > Vol. 58 N° 2 (Février 2012) . - pp. 236-252 Mots-clés : Social  networks  CEO  turnover  Board  of  directors  Firm  performance  Corporate  governance Résumé : This paper investigates the impact of social ties on the effectiveness of boards of directors. When the chief executive officer (CEO) and a number of directors belong to the same social networks, the CEO is less likely to be dismissed for poor performance. The results are robust to different measures of performance and networks, and consistent after controlling for CEO ability and connected boards' superior information. Although being ousted is costly for all CEOs—who must then devote time to finding new employment and only succeed in 62% of cases—socially connected CEOs are more likely to find new and better employment after a forced departure. Evidence from this paper suggests that close social ties between board members and CEOs impact the workings of the board of directors. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/58/2/236.abstract