Documents disponibles écrits par cet auteur

Bubbles and information / Matthias Sutter in Management science, Vol. 58 N° 2 (Février 2012) 

Public ISBD [article]  in Management science > Vol. 58 N° 2 (Février 2012) . - pp. 384-393 Titre : Bubbles and information : An experiment Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Matthias Sutter, Auteur ; Jürgen Huber, Auteur ; Michael Kirchler, Auteur Année de publication : 2012 Article en page(s) : pp. 384-393 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Finance  Experiment  Bubbles Résumé : A symmetric distribution of information, although omnipresent in real markets, is rarely considered in experimental economics. We study whether information about imminent future dividends can abate bubbles in experimental asset markets. We find that markets with asymmetrically informed traders have significantly smaller bubbles than markets with symmetrically informed or uninformed traders. Hence, fundamental values are better reflected in market prices—implying higher market efficiency—when some traders know more than others about future dividends. This suggests that bubbles are abated when traders know that a subset of them have an edge (in information) over others. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/58/2/384.abstract [article] Bubbles and information : An experiment [texte imprimé] / Matthias Sutter, Auteur ; Jürgen Huber, Auteur ; Michael Kirchler, Auteur . - 2012 . - pp. 384-393. Management Langues : Anglais (eng) in Management science > Vol. 58 N° 2 (Février 2012) . - pp. 384-393 Mots-clés : Finance  Experiment  Bubbles Résumé : A symmetric distribution of information, although omnipresent in real markets, is rarely considered in experimental economics. We study whether information about imminent future dividends can abate bubbles in experimental asset markets. We find that markets with asymmetrically informed traders have significantly smaller bubbles than markets with symmetrically informed or uninformed traders. Hence, fundamental values are better reflected in market prices—implying higher market efficiency—when some traders know more than others about future dividends. This suggests that bubbles are abated when traders know that a subset of them have an edge (in information) over others. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/58/2/384.abstract

Psychological pressure in competitive environments / Martin G. Kocher in Management science, Vol. 58 N° 8 (Août 2012) 

Public ISBD [article]  in Management science > Vol. 58 N° 8 (Août 2012) . - pp.1585-1591 Titre : Psychological pressure in competitive environments : New evidence from randomized natural experiments Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Martin G. Kocher, Auteur ; Marc V. Lenz, Auteur ; Matthias Sutter, Auteur Année de publication : 2012 Article en page(s) : pp.1585-1591 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Tournament  First-mover  advantage  Psychological  pressure  field  experiment  Soccer  Penalty  shootouts Résumé : Dynamic competitive settings may create psychological pressure when feedback about the performance of competitors is provided before the end of the competition. Such psychological pressure could produce a first-mover advantage, despite a priori equal winning probabilities. Using data from a randomized natural experiment—penalty shootouts in soccer—we reexamine evidence by Apesteguia and Palacios-Huerta [Apesteguia J, Palacios-Huerta I (2010) Psychological pressure in competitive environments: Evidence from a randomized natural experiment. Amer. Econom. Rev. 100(5):2548–2564]. They report a 21-percentage-point advantage for first movers over second movers in terms of winning probabilities. Extending their sample of 129 shootouts to 540, we fail to detect any significant first-mover advantage. Our results are fully consistent with recent evidence from other sports contests. ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/58/8/1585.short [article] Psychological pressure in competitive environments : New evidence from randomized natural experiments [texte imprimé] / Martin G. Kocher, Auteur ; Marc V. Lenz, Auteur ; Matthias Sutter, Auteur . - 2012 . - pp.1585-1591. Management Langues : Anglais (eng) in Management science > Vol. 58 N° 8 (Août 2012) . - pp.1585-1591 Mots-clés : Tournament  First-mover  advantage  Psychological  pressure  field  experiment  Soccer  Penalty  shootouts Résumé : Dynamic competitive settings may create psychological pressure when feedback about the performance of competitors is provided before the end of the competition. Such psychological pressure could produce a first-mover advantage, despite a priori equal winning probabilities. Using data from a randomized natural experiment—penalty shootouts in soccer—we reexamine evidence by Apesteguia and Palacios-Huerta [Apesteguia J, Palacios-Huerta I (2010) Psychological pressure in competitive environments: Evidence from a randomized natural experiment. Amer. Econom. Rev. 100(5):2548–2564]. They report a 21-percentage-point advantage for first movers over second movers in terms of winning probabilities. Extending their sample of 129 shootouts to 540, we fail to detect any significant first-mover advantage. Our results are fully consistent with recent evidence from other sports contests. ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/58/8/1585.short