Documents disponibles écrits par cet auteur

Modelling ‘contracts’ between a terrorist group and a government in a sequential game / F. He in Journal of the operational research society (JORS), Vol. 63 N° 6 (Juin 2012) 

Public ISBD [article]  in Journal of the operational research society (JORS) > Vol. 63 N° 6 (Juin 2012) . - pp. 790–809 Titre : Modelling ‘contracts’ between a terrorist group and a government in a sequential game Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : F. He, Auteur ; J. Zhuang, Auteur Année de publication : 2012 Article en page(s) : pp. 790–809 Note générale : Recherche opérationnelle Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Contracts  Game  theory  Homeland  security  Preferences  for  rent  Sequential  game  Target  valuations Index. décimale : 001.424 Résumé : In this paper, we apply a sequential game to study the possibility of ‘contracts’ (or at least mutually beneficial arrangements) between a government and a terrorist group. We find equilibrium solutions for complete and incomplete information models, where the government defends and/or provides positive rent, and the terrorist group attacks. We also study the sensitivities of equilibria as a function of both players’ target valuations and preferences for rent. The contract option, if successful, may achieve (partial) attack deterrence, and significantly increase the payoffs not only for the government, but also for some types of terrorist groups. Our work thus provides some novel insights in combating terrorism. DEWEY : 001.424 ISSN : 0160-5682 En ligne : http://www.palgrave-journals.com/jors/journal/v63/n6/abs/jors201149a.html [article] Modelling ‘contracts’ between a terrorist group and a government in a sequential game [texte imprimé] / F. He, Auteur ; J. Zhuang, Auteur . - 2012 . - pp. 790–809. Recherche opérationnelle Langues : Anglais (eng) in Journal of the operational research society (JORS) > Vol. 63 N° 6 (Juin 2012) . - pp. 790–809 Mots-clés : Contracts  Game  theory  Homeland  security  Preferences  for  rent  Sequential  game  Target  valuations Index. décimale : 001.424 Résumé : In this paper, we apply a sequential game to study the possibility of ‘contracts’ (or at least mutually beneficial arrangements) between a government and a terrorist group. We find equilibrium solutions for complete and incomplete information models, where the government defends and/or provides positive rent, and the terrorist group attacks. We also study the sensitivities of equilibria as a function of both players’ target valuations and preferences for rent. The contract option, if successful, may achieve (partial) attack deterrence, and significantly increase the payoffs not only for the government, but also for some types of terrorist groups. Our work thus provides some novel insights in combating terrorism. DEWEY : 001.424 ISSN : 0160-5682 En ligne : http://www.palgrave-journals.com/jors/journal/v63/n6/abs/jors201149a.html

The timing and deterrence of terrorist attacks due to exogenous dynamics / K. Hausken in Journal of the operational research society (JORS), Vol. 63 N° 6 (Juin 2012) 

Public ISBD [article]  in Journal of the operational research society (JORS) > Vol. 63 N° 6 (Juin 2012) . - pp. 726–735 Titre : The timing and deterrence of terrorist attacks due to exogenous dynamics Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : K. Hausken, Auteur ; J. Zhuang, Auteur Année de publication : 2012 Article en page(s) : pp. 726–735 Note générale : Operational research Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Terrorism  Terror  capacity  Threat  Conflict  Dynamics  Contest  success  function Index. décimale : 001.424 Résumé : In this paper, we develop a model for the timing and deterrence of terrorist attacks due to exogenous dynamics. The defender moves first and the attacker second in a two-stage game which is repeated over T periods. We study the effects of dynamics of several critical components of counter-terrorism games, including the unit defence costs (eg, immediately after an attack, the defender would easily acquire defensive funding), unit attack costs (eg, the attacker may accumulate resources as time goes), and the asset valuation (eg, the asset valuation may change over time). We study deterministic dynamics and conduct simulations using random dynamics. We determine the timing of terrorist attacks and how these can be deterred. DEWEY : 001.424 ISSN : 0160-5682 En ligne : http://www.palgrave-journals.com/jors/journal/v63/n6/abs/jors201179a.html [article] The timing and deterrence of terrorist attacks due to exogenous dynamics [texte imprimé] / K. Hausken, Auteur ; J. Zhuang, Auteur . - 2012 . - pp. 726–735. Operational research Langues : Anglais (eng) in Journal of the operational research society (JORS) > Vol. 63 N° 6 (Juin 2012) . - pp. 726–735 Mots-clés : Terrorism  Terror  capacity  Threat  Conflict  Dynamics  Contest  success  function Index. décimale : 001.424 Résumé : In this paper, we develop a model for the timing and deterrence of terrorist attacks due to exogenous dynamics. The defender moves first and the attacker second in a two-stage game which is repeated over T periods. We study the effects of dynamics of several critical components of counter-terrorism games, including the unit defence costs (eg, immediately after an attack, the defender would easily acquire defensive funding), unit attack costs (eg, the attacker may accumulate resources as time goes), and the asset valuation (eg, the asset valuation may change over time). We study deterministic dynamics and conduct simulations using random dynamics. We determine the timing of terrorist attacks and how these can be deterred. DEWEY : 001.424 ISSN : 0160-5682 En ligne : http://www.palgrave-journals.com/jors/journal/v63/n6/abs/jors201179a.html