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Competition between organizational groups / Lorenz Goette in Management science, Vol. 58 N° 5 (Mai 2012) 

Public ISBD [article]  in Management science > Vol. 58 N° 5 (Mai 2012) . - pp. 948-960 Titre : Competition between organizational groups : Its impact on altruistic and antisocial motivations Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Lorenz Goette, Auteur ; David Huffman, Auteur ; Stephan Meier, Auteur Année de publication : 2012 Article en page(s) : pp. 948-960 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Group  decisions  Cooperation  Punishment  Experiment  Army Résumé : Firms are often organized into groups. Group membership has been shown empirically to have positive effects, in the form of increased prosocial behavior toward in-group members. This includes an enhanced willingness to engage in altruistic punishment of inefficient defection. Our paper provides evidence of a dark side of group membership. In the presence of cues of competition between groups, a taste for harming the out-group emerges: punishment ceases to serve a norm enforcement function, and instead, out-group members are punished harder and regardless of whether they cooperate or defect. Our results point to a mechanism that might help explain previous mixed results on the social value of punishment, and they contribute to understanding the sources of conflict between groups. They also point to an important trade-off for firms: introducing competition enhances within-group efficiency but also generates costly between-group conflict. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/58/5/948.abstract [article] Competition between organizational groups : Its impact on altruistic and antisocial motivations [texte imprimé] / Lorenz Goette, Auteur ; David Huffman, Auteur ; Stephan Meier, Auteur . - 2012 . - pp. 948-960. Management Langues : Anglais (eng) in Management science > Vol. 58 N° 5 (Mai 2012) . - pp. 948-960 Mots-clés : Group  decisions  Cooperation  Punishment  Experiment  Army Résumé : Firms are often organized into groups. Group membership has been shown empirically to have positive effects, in the form of increased prosocial behavior toward in-group members. This includes an enhanced willingness to engage in altruistic punishment of inefficient defection. Our paper provides evidence of a dark side of group membership. In the presence of cues of competition between groups, a taste for harming the out-group emerges: punishment ceases to serve a norm enforcement function, and instead, out-group members are punished harder and regardless of whether they cooperate or defect. Our results point to a mechanism that might help explain previous mixed results on the social value of punishment, and they contribute to understanding the sources of conflict between groups. They also point to an important trade-off for firms: introducing competition enhances within-group efficiency but also generates costly between-group conflict. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/58/5/948.abstract