Documents disponibles écrits par cet auteur

Relicensing as a secondary market strategy / Nektarios Oraiopoulos in Management science, Vol. 58 N° 5 (Mai 2012) 

Public ISBD [article]  in Management science > Vol. 58 N° 5 (Mai 2012) . - pp. 1022-1037 Titre : Relicensing as a secondary market strategy Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Nektarios Oraiopoulos, Auteur ; Mark E. Ferguson, Auteur ; L. Beril Toktay, Auteur Année de publication : 2012 Article en page(s) : pp. 1022-1037 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Durable  goods  Secondary  market  Relicensing  fee  Remanufacturing  Closed-loop  supply  chain Résumé : Secondary markets in the information technology industry, where used or refurbished equipment is traded, have been growing steadily. For original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) in this industry, the importance of secondary markets has grown in parallel, not only as a source of revenue, but also because of their impact on these firms' competitive advantage and market strategy. Recent articles in the press have severely criticized some OEMs who are perceived to be actively trying to eliminate the secondary market for their products. Other OEMs have policies that enhance their secondary markets. The goal of this paper is to understand how an OEM's incentives and optimal strategies vis-à-vis the secondary market are shaped contingent on her relative competitive advantage, product characteristics, and consumer preferences. The critical trade-off that we examine is whether the indirect benefit from maintaining an active secondary market (the resale value effect) can outweigh the potentially negative effect of the sales of used products at the expense of new product sales (the cannibalization effect). To that end, we develop a durable good model where the OEM can directly affect the resale value of her product through a relicensing fee charged to the buyer of the refurbished equipment. We analyze the OEM's strategy in both the monopoly and the duopoly cases, characterize the optimal relicensing fee set by the OEM, and draw conclusions on the conditions that favor stimulating or deterring the secondary market. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/58/5/1022.abstract [article] Relicensing as a secondary market strategy [texte imprimé] / Nektarios Oraiopoulos, Auteur ; Mark E. Ferguson, Auteur ; L. Beril Toktay, Auteur . - 2012 . - pp. 1022-1037. Management Langues : Anglais (eng) in Management science > Vol. 58 N° 5 (Mai 2012) . - pp. 1022-1037 Mots-clés : Durable  goods  Secondary  market  Relicensing  fee  Remanufacturing  Closed-loop  supply  chain Résumé : Secondary markets in the information technology industry, where used or refurbished equipment is traded, have been growing steadily. For original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) in this industry, the importance of secondary markets has grown in parallel, not only as a source of revenue, but also because of their impact on these firms' competitive advantage and market strategy. Recent articles in the press have severely criticized some OEMs who are perceived to be actively trying to eliminate the secondary market for their products. Other OEMs have policies that enhance their secondary markets. The goal of this paper is to understand how an OEM's incentives and optimal strategies vis-à-vis the secondary market are shaped contingent on her relative competitive advantage, product characteristics, and consumer preferences. The critical trade-off that we examine is whether the indirect benefit from maintaining an active secondary market (the resale value effect) can outweigh the potentially negative effect of the sales of used products at the expense of new product sales (the cannibalization effect). To that end, we develop a durable good model where the OEM can directly affect the resale value of her product through a relicensing fee charged to the buyer of the refurbished equipment. We analyze the OEM's strategy in both the monopoly and the duopoly cases, characterize the optimal relicensing fee set by the OEM, and draw conclusions on the conditions that favor stimulating or deterring the secondary market. DEWEY : 658 ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/58/5/1022.abstract