Modelling ‘contracts’ between a terrorist group and a government in a sequential game / F. He in Journal of the operational research society (JORS), Vol. 63 N° 6 (Juin 2012)  

Public ISBD [article]  inJournal of the operational research society (JORS) > Vol. 63 N° 6 (Juin 2012) . - pp. 790–809 Titre : Modelling ‘contracts’ between a terrorist group and a government in a sequential game Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : F. He, Auteur ; J. Zhuang, Auteur Année de publication : 2012 Article en page(s) : pp. 790–809 Note générale : Recherche opérationnelle Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Contracts Game theory Homeland security Preferences for rent Sequential game Target valuations Index. décimale : 001.424 Résumé : In this paper, we apply a sequential game to study the possibility of ‘contracts’ (or at least mutually beneficial arrangements) between a government and a terrorist group. We find equilibrium solutions for complete and incomplete information models, where the government defends and/or provides positive rent, and the terrorist group attacks. We also study the sensitivities of equilibria as a function of both players’ target valuations and preferences for rent. The contract option, if successful, may achieve (partial) attack deterrence, and significantly increase the payoffs not only for the government, but also for some types of terrorist groups. Our work thus provides some novel insights in combating terrorism. DEWEY : 001.424 ISSN : 0160-5682 En ligne : http://www.palgrave-journals.com/jors/journal/v63/n6/abs/jors201149a.html [article] Modelling ‘contracts’ between a terrorist group and a government in a sequential game [texte imprimé] / F. He, Auteur ; J. Zhuang, Auteur . - 2012 . - pp. 790–809. Recherche opérationnelle Langues : Anglais (eng) in Journal of the operational research society (JORS) > Vol. 63 N° 6 (Juin 2012) . - pp. 790–809 Mots-clés : Contracts Game theory Homeland security Preferences for rent Sequential game Target valuations Index. décimale : 001.424 Résumé : In this paper, we apply a sequential game to study the possibility of ‘contracts’ (or at least mutually beneficial arrangements) between a government and a terrorist group. We find equilibrium solutions for complete and incomplete information models, where the government defends and/or provides positive rent, and the terrorist group attacks. We also study the sensitivities of equilibria as a function of both players’ target valuations and preferences for rent. The contract option, if successful, may achieve (partial) attack deterrence, and significantly increase the payoffs not only for the government, but also for some types of terrorist groups. Our work thus provides some novel insights in combating terrorism. DEWEY : 001.424 ISSN : 0160-5682 En ligne : http://www.palgrave-journals.com/jors/journal/v63/n6/abs/jors201149a.html

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