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Détail de l'auteur
Auteur Kenan Arifoglu
Documents disponibles écrits par cet auteur
Affiner la rechercheConsumption externality and yield uncertainty in the influenza vaccine supply chain / Kenan Arifoglu in Management science, Vol. 58 N° 6 (Juin 2012)
[article]
in Management science > Vol. 58 N° 6 (Juin 2012) . - pp.1072-1091
Titre : Consumption externality and yield uncertainty in the influenza vaccine supply chain : Interventions in demand and supply sides Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Kenan Arifoglu, Auteur ; Sarang Deo, Auteur ; Seyed M. R. Iravani, Auteur Année de publication : 2012 Article en page(s) : pp.1072-1091 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Influenza vaccine Supply chain inefficiency Strategic consumer behavior Externality Yield uncertainty Résumé : We study the impact of yield uncertainty (supply side) and self-interested consumers (demand side) on the inefficiency in the influenza vaccine supply chain. Previous economic studies, focusing on demand side, find that the equilibrium demand is always less than the socially optimal demand because self-interested individuals do not internalize the social benefit of protecting others via reduced infectiousness (positive externality). In contrast, we show that the equilibrium demand can be greater than the socially optimal demand after accounting for the limited supply due to yield uncertainty and manufacturer's incentives. The main driver for this result is a second (negative) externality: Self-interested individuals ignore that vaccinating people with high infection costs is more beneficial for the society when supply is limited. We show that the extent of the negative externality can be reduced through more efficient and less uncertain allocation mechanisms. To investigate the relative effectiveness of government interventions on supply and demand sides under various demand and supply characteristics, we construct two partially centralized scenarios where the social planner (i.e., government) intervenes either on the demand side or the supply side, but not both. We conduct an extensive numerical analysis. ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/58/6/1072.short [article] Consumption externality and yield uncertainty in the influenza vaccine supply chain : Interventions in demand and supply sides [texte imprimé] / Kenan Arifoglu, Auteur ; Sarang Deo, Auteur ; Seyed M. R. Iravani, Auteur . - 2012 . - pp.1072-1091.
Management
Langues : Anglais (eng)
in Management science > Vol. 58 N° 6 (Juin 2012) . - pp.1072-1091
Mots-clés : Influenza vaccine Supply chain inefficiency Strategic consumer behavior Externality Yield uncertainty Résumé : We study the impact of yield uncertainty (supply side) and self-interested consumers (demand side) on the inefficiency in the influenza vaccine supply chain. Previous economic studies, focusing on demand side, find that the equilibrium demand is always less than the socially optimal demand because self-interested individuals do not internalize the social benefit of protecting others via reduced infectiousness (positive externality). In contrast, we show that the equilibrium demand can be greater than the socially optimal demand after accounting for the limited supply due to yield uncertainty and manufacturer's incentives. The main driver for this result is a second (negative) externality: Self-interested individuals ignore that vaccinating people with high infection costs is more beneficial for the society when supply is limited. We show that the extent of the negative externality can be reduced through more efficient and less uncertain allocation mechanisms. To investigate the relative effectiveness of government interventions on supply and demand sides under various demand and supply characteristics, we construct two partially centralized scenarios where the social planner (i.e., government) intervenes either on the demand side or the supply side, but not both. We conduct an extensive numerical analysis. ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/58/6/1072.short