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Public opinion and executive compensation / Camelia M. Kuhnen in Management science, Vol. 58 N° 7 (Juillet 2012) 

Public ISBD [article]  in Management science > Vol. 58 N° 7 (Juillet 2012) . - pp.1249-1272 Titre : Public opinion and executive compensation Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Camelia M. Kuhnen, Auteur ; Alexandra Niessen, Auteur Année de publication : 2012 Article en page(s) : pp.1249-1272 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Executive  compensation  Public  Opinion Résumé : We investigate whether public opinion influences the level and structure of executive compensation. During 1992–2008, the negativity of press coverage of chief executive officer (CEO) pay varied significantly, with stock options being the most criticized pay component. We find that after more negative press coverage of CEO pay, firms reduce option grants and increase less contentious types of pay such as salary, although overall compensation does not change. The reduction in option pay after increased press negativity is more pronounced when firms, CEOs, and boards have stronger reputation concerns. Our within-firm, within-year identification shows the results cannot be explained by annual changes in accounting rules regarding executive compensation, stock market conditions, or pay mean reversion. ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/early/2012/02/27/mnsc.1110.1490.abstra [...] [article] Public opinion and executive compensation [texte imprimé] / Camelia M. Kuhnen, Auteur ; Alexandra Niessen, Auteur . - 2012 . - pp.1249-1272. Management Langues : Anglais (eng) in Management science > Vol. 58 N° 7 (Juillet 2012) . - pp.1249-1272 Mots-clés : Executive  compensation  Public  Opinion Résumé : We investigate whether public opinion influences the level and structure of executive compensation. During 1992–2008, the negativity of press coverage of chief executive officer (CEO) pay varied significantly, with stock options being the most criticized pay component. We find that after more negative press coverage of CEO pay, firms reduce option grants and increase less contentious types of pay such as salary, although overall compensation does not change. The reduction in option pay after increased press negativity is more pronounced when firms, CEOs, and boards have stronger reputation concerns. Our within-firm, within-year identification shows the results cannot be explained by annual changes in accounting rules regarding executive compensation, stock market conditions, or pay mean reversion. ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/early/2012/02/27/mnsc.1110.1490.abstra [...]