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Outsourcing a two - level service process / Hsiao-Hui Lee in Management science, Vol. 58 N° 8 (Août 2012) 

Public ISBD [article]  in Management science > Vol. 58 N° 8 (Août 2012) . - pp.1569-1584 Titre : Outsourcing a two - level service process Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Hsiao-Hui Lee, Auteur ; Edieal J. Pinker, Auteur ; Robert A. Shumsky, Auteur Année de publication : 2012 Article en page(s) : pp.1569-1584 Note générale : Management Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Queues  Aplications  Industries  Business  services  Information  systems  IT  policy  and  management  Outsourcing Résumé : This paper studies outsourcing decisions for a two-level service process in which the first level serves as a gatekeeper for a second level of experts. The objective of the system operator (the client) is to minimize the sum of staffing costs, customer waiting costs, and mistreatment costs due to unsuccessful attempts by a gatekeeper to solve the customer's problem. The client may outsource all or part of the process to a vendor, and first-best contracts exist when the client outsources only gatekeepers or experts. When the client outsources the entire system as a two-level process, a client-optimal contract may not exist unless the exogenous system parameters satisfy a particular (and unlikely) coordination condition. In addition, optimal incentive-compatible contracts exist when the vendor's structure choice (one level or two levels) can deviate from the client's preference. Finally, we numerically examine how vendor structure choice and labor cost advantages influence the client's optimal outsourcing option. ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/58/8/1569.short [article] Outsourcing a two - level service process [texte imprimé] / Hsiao-Hui Lee, Auteur ; Edieal J. Pinker, Auteur ; Robert A. Shumsky, Auteur . - 2012 . - pp.1569-1584. Management Langues : Anglais (eng) in Management science > Vol. 58 N° 8 (Août 2012) . - pp.1569-1584 Mots-clés : Queues  Aplications  Industries  Business  services  Information  systems  IT  policy  and  management  Outsourcing Résumé : This paper studies outsourcing decisions for a two-level service process in which the first level serves as a gatekeeper for a second level of experts. The objective of the system operator (the client) is to minimize the sum of staffing costs, customer waiting costs, and mistreatment costs due to unsuccessful attempts by a gatekeeper to solve the customer's problem. The client may outsource all or part of the process to a vendor, and first-best contracts exist when the client outsources only gatekeepers or experts. When the client outsources the entire system as a two-level process, a client-optimal contract may not exist unless the exogenous system parameters satisfy a particular (and unlikely) coordination condition. In addition, optimal incentive-compatible contracts exist when the vendor's structure choice (one level or two levels) can deviate from the client's preference. Finally, we numerically examine how vendor structure choice and labor cost advantages influence the client's optimal outsourcing option. ISSN : 0025-1909 En ligne : http://mansci.journal.informs.org/content/58/8/1569.short