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A smuggling game with asymmetrical information of players / R. Hohzaki in Journal of the operational research society (JORS), Vol. 63 N° 10 (Octobre 2012) 

Public ISBD [article]  in Journal of the operational research society (JORS) > Vol. 63 N° 10 (Octobre 2012) . - pp. 1434–1446 Titre : A smuggling game with asymmetrical information of players Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : R. Hohzaki, Auteur ; R. Masuda, Auteur Année de publication : 2012 Article en page(s) : pp. 1434–1446 Note générale : operational research Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : game  theory;  linear  programming;  military;  decision  analysis Index. décimale : 001.424 Résumé : This paper deals with a smuggling game with multiple stages. Customs is allowed to patrol within the limited number of chances and obtain reward by the capture of a smuggler. The smuggler gets a reward depending on the amount of contraband he succeeds to ship in smuggling at each stage. The pay-off of the game is zero-sum. In almost all past studies, they adopt the alternative of smuggling or non-smuggling as the smuggler's strategy. From the point of view of information, some researchers assumed that both players could observe their opponent's behaviour at the past stage or a few assumed that both players had no information about their opponent. Other than these types of smuggling games with the symmetric information, we introduce the asymmetrical acquisition of information or the concept of perfect Bayesian equilibrium in the smuggling game for the first time. DEWEY : 001.424 ISSN : 0160-5682 En ligne : http://www.palgrave-journals.com/jors/journal/v63/n10/abs/jors2011161a.html [article] A smuggling game with asymmetrical information of players [texte imprimé] / R. Hohzaki, Auteur ; R. Masuda, Auteur . - 2012 . - pp. 1434–1446. operational research Langues : Anglais (eng) in Journal of the operational research society (JORS) > Vol. 63 N° 10 (Octobre 2012) . - pp. 1434–1446 Mots-clés : game  theory;  linear  programming;  military;  decision  analysis Index. décimale : 001.424 Résumé : This paper deals with a smuggling game with multiple stages. Customs is allowed to patrol within the limited number of chances and obtain reward by the capture of a smuggler. The smuggler gets a reward depending on the amount of contraband he succeeds to ship in smuggling at each stage. The pay-off of the game is zero-sum. In almost all past studies, they adopt the alternative of smuggling or non-smuggling as the smuggler's strategy. From the point of view of information, some researchers assumed that both players could observe their opponent's behaviour at the past stage or a few assumed that both players had no information about their opponent. Other than these types of smuggling games with the symmetric information, we introduce the asymmetrical acquisition of information or the concept of perfect Bayesian equilibrium in the smuggling game for the first time. DEWEY : 001.424 ISSN : 0160-5682 En ligne : http://www.palgrave-journals.com/jors/journal/v63/n10/abs/jors2011161a.html