Documents disponibles écrits par cet auteur

Defending and improving the ‘slotting fee’ / Y-Y. Wang in Journal of the operational research society (JORS), Vol. 63 N° 12 (Décembre 2012) 

Public ISBD [article]  in Journal of the operational research society (JORS) > Vol. 63 N° 12 (Décembre 2012) . - pp. 1731–1751 Titre : Defending and improving the ‘slotting fee’ : how it can benefit all the stakeholders dealing with a newsvendor product with price and effort-dependent demand Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Y-Y. Wang, Auteur ; H-S. Lau, Auteur ; J-C. Wang, Auteur Année de publication : 2013 Article en page(s) : pp. 1731–1751 Note générale : operational research Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : pricing;  slotting  fee;  composite  pricing  contract  format;  Stackelberg-dominant  retailer;  newsvendor  product Index. décimale : 001.424 Résumé : ‘Slotting fee’ (hereafter ‘SF’) is an upfront fee a ‘supplier’ is required to pay a retailer in order to have his product sold on the retailer's shelves. It is becoming increasingly common, but also widely reviled. This paper considers a newsvendor product whose expected demand is dependent on retail price and sales effort. The question we pose is: given that the Stackelberg-dominant retailer has to choose a pricing contract with which she transacts with the supplier, how would the supply-chain stakeholders fare when the retailer implements SF instead of another practical pricing contract? We show that, contradicting its negative public image, SF empowers the dominant retailer to specify contract terms that will benefit all the stakeholder-groups. That is, the supplier's and the retailer's profits are higher, the production workers are asked to produce more, and the consumers pay a lower retail price. We also propose a new ‘composite’ contract format that incorporates both the SF and ‘buyback’ features. This composite format empowers the retailer to provide even greater benefits to the supply-chain's stakeholders. DEWEY : 001.424 ISSN : 0160-5682 En ligne : http://www.palgrave-journals.com/jors/journal/v63/n12/abs/jors2011111a.html [article] Defending and improving the ‘slotting fee’ : how it can benefit all the stakeholders dealing with a newsvendor product with price and effort-dependent demand [texte imprimé] / Y-Y. Wang, Auteur ; H-S. Lau, Auteur ; J-C. Wang, Auteur . - 2013 . - pp. 1731–1751. operational research Langues : Anglais (eng) in Journal of the operational research society (JORS) > Vol. 63 N° 12 (Décembre 2012) . - pp. 1731–1751 Mots-clés : pricing;  slotting  fee;  composite  pricing  contract  format;  Stackelberg-dominant  retailer;  newsvendor  product Index. décimale : 001.424 Résumé : ‘Slotting fee’ (hereafter ‘SF’) is an upfront fee a ‘supplier’ is required to pay a retailer in order to have his product sold on the retailer's shelves. It is becoming increasingly common, but also widely reviled. This paper considers a newsvendor product whose expected demand is dependent on retail price and sales effort. The question we pose is: given that the Stackelberg-dominant retailer has to choose a pricing contract with which she transacts with the supplier, how would the supply-chain stakeholders fare when the retailer implements SF instead of another practical pricing contract? We show that, contradicting its negative public image, SF empowers the dominant retailer to specify contract terms that will benefit all the stakeholder-groups. That is, the supplier's and the retailer's profits are higher, the production workers are asked to produce more, and the consumers pay a lower retail price. We also propose a new ‘composite’ contract format that incorporates both the SF and ‘buyback’ features. This composite format empowers the retailer to provide even greater benefits to the supply-chain's stakeholders. DEWEY : 001.424 ISSN : 0160-5682 En ligne : http://www.palgrave-journals.com/jors/journal/v63/n12/abs/jors2011111a.html

Three revenue-sharing variants / Y-Y. Wang in Journal of the operational research society (JORS), Vol. 63 N° 12 (Décembre 2012) 

Public ISBD [article]  in Journal of the operational research society (JORS) > Vol. 63 N° 12 (Décembre 2012) . - pp. 1752–1764 Titre : Three revenue-sharing variants : their significant performance differences under system-parameter uncertainties Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Y-Y. Wang, Auteur ; H-S. Lau, Auteur ; Z-S Hua, Auteur Année de publication : 2013 Article en page(s) : pp. 1752–1764 Note générale : operational research Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : supply  chain  contract  design;  revenue  sharing;  decision  making  under  uncertain  system  parameters;  stackelberg  game  structure Index. décimale : 001.424 Résumé : In the widely studied ‘revenue sharing’ (hereafter [RS]) contract format, the manufacturer of a product not only charges the retailer a unit wholesale price w, but also requires the retailer to share part of the product's revenue (ie, the unit retail price p) with him. For a product with price-dependent demand, it is well known that if a dominant manufacturer knows the system parameters deterministically, then [RS] gives him the perfect power of simultaneously coordinating the channel and allocating profit arbitrarily. Unfortunately, [RS]'s power deteriorates as the manufacturer's knowledge of the system parameters becomes increasingly uncertain. This paper shows that this deterioration can be substantially reduced by using slightly modified versions of [RS]; these modifications roughly amount to sharing a retailer's gross profit instead of revenue. In other words, this paper presents simple modifications to the classical [RS], leading to contract formats that perform substantially better under system-parameter uncertainty. DEWEY : 001.424 ISSN : 0160-5682 En ligne : http://www.palgrave-journals.com/jors/journal/v63/n12/abs/jors2011131a.html [article] Three revenue-sharing variants : their significant performance differences under system-parameter uncertainties [texte imprimé] / Y-Y. Wang, Auteur ; H-S. Lau, Auteur ; Z-S Hua, Auteur . - 2013 . - pp. 1752–1764. operational research Langues : Anglais (eng) in Journal of the operational research society (JORS) > Vol. 63 N° 12 (Décembre 2012) . - pp. 1752–1764 Mots-clés : supply  chain  contract  design;  revenue  sharing;  decision  making  under  uncertain  system  parameters;  stackelberg  game  structure Index. décimale : 001.424 Résumé : In the widely studied ‘revenue sharing’ (hereafter [RS]) contract format, the manufacturer of a product not only charges the retailer a unit wholesale price w, but also requires the retailer to share part of the product's revenue (ie, the unit retail price p) with him. For a product with price-dependent demand, it is well known that if a dominant manufacturer knows the system parameters deterministically, then [RS] gives him the perfect power of simultaneously coordinating the channel and allocating profit arbitrarily. Unfortunately, [RS]'s power deteriorates as the manufacturer's knowledge of the system parameters becomes increasingly uncertain. This paper shows that this deterioration can be substantially reduced by using slightly modified versions of [RS]; these modifications roughly amount to sharing a retailer's gross profit instead of revenue. In other words, this paper presents simple modifications to the classical [RS], leading to contract formats that perform substantially better under system-parameter uncertainty. DEWEY : 001.424 ISSN : 0160-5682 En ligne : http://www.palgrave-journals.com/jors/journal/v63/n12/abs/jors2011131a.html