Defending and improving the ‘slotting fee’ / Y-Y. Wang in Journal of the operational research society (JORS), Vol. 63 N° 12 (Décembre 2012)  

Public ISBD [article]  inJournal of the operational research society (JORS) > Vol. 63 N° 12 (Décembre 2012) . - pp. 1731–1751 Titre : Defending and improving the ‘slotting fee’ : how it can benefit all the stakeholders dealing with a newsvendor product with price and effort-dependent demand Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Y-Y. Wang, Auteur ; H-S. Lau, Auteur ; J-C. Wang, Auteur Année de publication : 2013 Article en page(s) : pp. 1731–1751 Note générale : operational research Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : pricing  slotting fee  composite pricing contract format  Stackelberg-dominant retailer  newsvendor product Index. décimale : 001.424 Résumé : ‘Slotting fee’ (hereafter ‘SF’) is an upfront fee a ‘supplier’ is required to pay a retailer in order to have his product sold on the retailer's shelves. It is becoming increasingly common, but also widely reviled. This paper considers a newsvendor product whose expected demand is dependent on retail price and sales effort. The question we pose is: given that the Stackelberg-dominant retailer has to choose a pricing contract with which she transacts with the supplier, how would the supply-chain stakeholders fare when the retailer implements SF instead of another practical pricing contract? We show that, contradicting its negative public image, SF empowers the dominant retailer to specify contract terms that will benefit all the stakeholder-groups. That is, the supplier's and the retailer's profits are higher, the production workers are asked to produce more, and the consumers pay a lower retail price. We also propose a new ‘composite’ contract format that incorporates both the SF and ‘buyback’ features. This composite format empowers the retailer to provide even greater benefits to the supply-chain's stakeholders. DEWEY : 001.424 ISSN : 0160-5682 En ligne : http://www.palgrave-journals.com/jors/journal/v63/n12/abs/jors2011111a.html [article] Defending and improving the ‘slotting fee’ : how it can benefit all the stakeholders dealing with a newsvendor product with price and effort-dependent demand [texte imprimé] / Y-Y. Wang, Auteur ; H-S. Lau, Auteur ; J-C. Wang, Auteur . - 2013 . - pp. 1731–1751. operational research Langues : Anglais (eng) in Journal of the operational research society (JORS) > Vol. 63 N° 12 (Décembre 2012) . - pp. 1731–1751 Mots-clés : pricing  slotting fee  composite pricing contract format  Stackelberg-dominant retailer  newsvendor product Index. décimale : 001.424 Résumé : ‘Slotting fee’ (hereafter ‘SF’) is an upfront fee a ‘supplier’ is required to pay a retailer in order to have his product sold on the retailer's shelves. It is becoming increasingly common, but also widely reviled. This paper considers a newsvendor product whose expected demand is dependent on retail price and sales effort. The question we pose is: given that the Stackelberg-dominant retailer has to choose a pricing contract with which she transacts with the supplier, how would the supply-chain stakeholders fare when the retailer implements SF instead of another practical pricing contract? We show that, contradicting its negative public image, SF empowers the dominant retailer to specify contract terms that will benefit all the stakeholder-groups. That is, the supplier's and the retailer's profits are higher, the production workers are asked to produce more, and the consumers pay a lower retail price. We also propose a new ‘composite’ contract format that incorporates both the SF and ‘buyback’ features. This composite format empowers the retailer to provide even greater benefits to the supply-chain's stakeholders. DEWEY : 001.424 ISSN : 0160-5682 En ligne : http://www.palgrave-journals.com/jors/journal/v63/n12/abs/jors2011111a.html

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