Three revenue-sharing variants / Y-Y. Wang in Journal of the operational research society (JORS), Vol. 63 N° 12 (Décembre 2012)  

Public ISBD [article]  inJournal of the operational research society (JORS) > Vol. 63 N° 12 (Décembre 2012) . - pp. 1752–1764 Titre : Three revenue-sharing variants : their significant performance differences under system-parameter uncertainties Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Y-Y. Wang, Auteur ; H-S. Lau, Auteur ; Z-S Hua, Auteur Année de publication : 2013 Article en page(s) : pp. 1752–1764 Note générale : operational research Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : supply chain contract design  revenue sharing  decision making under uncertain system parameters  stackelberg game structure Index. décimale : 001.424 Résumé : In the widely studied ‘revenue sharing’ (hereafter [RS]) contract format, the manufacturer of a product not only charges the retailer a unit wholesale price w, but also requires the retailer to share part of the product's revenue (ie, the unit retail price p) with him. For a product with price-dependent demand, it is well known that if a dominant manufacturer knows the system parameters deterministically, then [RS] gives him the perfect power of simultaneously coordinating the channel and allocating profit arbitrarily. Unfortunately, [RS]'s power deteriorates as the manufacturer's knowledge of the system parameters becomes increasingly uncertain. This paper shows that this deterioration can be substantially reduced by using slightly modified versions of [RS]; these modifications roughly amount to sharing a retailer's gross profit instead of revenue. In other words, this paper presents simple modifications to the classical [RS], leading to contract formats that perform substantially better under system-parameter uncertainty. DEWEY : 001.424 ISSN : 0160-5682 En ligne : http://www.palgrave-journals.com/jors/journal/v63/n12/abs/jors2011131a.html [article] Three revenue-sharing variants : their significant performance differences under system-parameter uncertainties [texte imprimé] / Y-Y. Wang, Auteur ; H-S. Lau, Auteur ; Z-S Hua, Auteur . - 2013 . - pp. 1752–1764. operational research Langues : Anglais (eng) in Journal of the operational research society (JORS) > Vol. 63 N° 12 (Décembre 2012) . - pp. 1752–1764 Mots-clés : supply chain contract design  revenue sharing  decision making under uncertain system parameters  stackelberg game structure Index. décimale : 001.424 Résumé : In the widely studied ‘revenue sharing’ (hereafter [RS]) contract format, the manufacturer of a product not only charges the retailer a unit wholesale price w, but also requires the retailer to share part of the product's revenue (ie, the unit retail price p) with him. For a product with price-dependent demand, it is well known that if a dominant manufacturer knows the system parameters deterministically, then [RS] gives him the perfect power of simultaneously coordinating the channel and allocating profit arbitrarily. Unfortunately, [RS]'s power deteriorates as the manufacturer's knowledge of the system parameters becomes increasingly uncertain. This paper shows that this deterioration can be substantially reduced by using slightly modified versions of [RS]; these modifications roughly amount to sharing a retailer's gross profit instead of revenue. In other words, this paper presents simple modifications to the classical [RS], leading to contract formats that perform substantially better under system-parameter uncertainty. DEWEY : 001.424 ISSN : 0160-5682 En ligne : http://www.palgrave-journals.com/jors/journal/v63/n12/abs/jors2011131a.html

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